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INTERFACES AND INTEROPERABILITY IN LOTUS V.
BORLAND: A MARKET-ORIENTED APPROACH
TO THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE
David R. Owen
INTRODUCTION
The evolution of computer technology has strained the ability of
copyright law to adapt to the modem world. Ever since courts first
held that computer programs were "works of authorship"' subject to
the protection of copyright law, authors and courts have been strug-
gling to fit the new technologies into the copyright paradigm. Because
of the continued expansion of computer technology and the growing
importance of the computer industry to the U.S. economy, this unset-
tled area of law is more important than ever.2
Historically, copyright law has been quite flexible in adapting to
new technologies and forms of creative expression. Copyright law has
successfully accommodated new technologies such as photography,
sound recording, and videotape.3 The advent of computer technology
has similarly resulted in the adaptation of many established principles
of copyright law to an entirely new environment. As computer tech-
nology advances and its importance to the U.S. economy grows, copy-
right law must continue to serve its proper role of promoting "the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts."4
Although the extension of copyright protection to computer pro-
grams was both natural and inevitable,5 the area of law continues to
be controversial and unsettled.6 Certain characteristics of computer
programs present unique problems for copyright and raise difficult is-
sues for legal commentators and decision makers to recognize and re-
solve.7 For example, can the manufacturer of a word processing
program prohibit other manufacturers from selling a program that can
access documents created by its program? Identification and resolu-
tion of such issues is necessary to advance the policy that copyright
law is designed to address.
To function properly, computer technology depends on a frame-
work for communication between computer programs and the cor-
1. See e.g., Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171, 173(N.D. Cal. 1981) (holding that a computer program is a 'work of authorship' ").
2. See Anthony L. Clapes, Software, Copyright, and Competition 19-20 (1989).
3. See Dan Rosen, A Common Law for the Ages of Intellectual Property, 38 U.
Miami L. Rev. 769, 770-73 & 776-78 (1984).
4. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
5. Raymond T. Nimmer & Patricia A. Krauthaus, Software Copyright: Sliding
Scales and Abstracted Expression, 32 Hous. L. Rev. 317, 328-29 (1995).
6. Id. at 318.
7. See Pamela Samuelson et al, A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of
Computer Programs, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2308, 2315-16 (1994) [hereinafter Manifesto].
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puter itself. Commentators have described this requirement as a need
for "interoperability" between computer technologies.8 Computer
programmers must address technical and practical requirements relat-
ing to interoperability to design their programs effectively. A broad
scope of copyright protection has the potential to exclude program-
mers from using material that is essential to interoperability. 9 Estab-
lished market leaders could use copyright law to preclude competitive
access to certain markets in any form. Conversely, a narrow scope of
copyright protection may provide inadequate incentives to create new
and useful programs.' °
Interoperability also has significance for the computer user. To op-
erate a computer program effectively, a computer user must spend a
significant amount of time learning how the program works." To as-
sist the user, some software companies have attempted to provide pro-
grams that work in the same way as popular preexisting programs.
Such conduct has raised a key copyright question: whether the law
prohibits the copying of certain parts of a program to allow a com-
puter user to employ the same skills to operate competing programs.1 2
The courts are currently in confusion concerning how copyright law
should address such interoperability issues in software13 copyright liti-
gation." Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International,5 a re-
cent case that addressed interoperability issues, resulted in a 4-4
deadlock in the Supreme Court,'6 indicating both the importance of
8. "'Interoperability' refers to the ability of consumers to use the products of
different manufacturers interchangeably or in combination." Peter A. Wald et al.,
Standards for Interoperability and the Copyright Protection of Computer Programs, in
Intellectual Property Antitrust: 1995, at 859 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, &
Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. G4-3942, 1995).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Manifesto, supra note 7, at 2374-75.
12. See Linda Skon, Comment, Copyright Protection of Computer User Interfaces:
"Creative Ferment" In the Courts, 27 Ariz. St. Li. 1063, 1063-64 (1995) (noting that
two courts have reached opposite conclusions regarding copyright protection for user
interfaces).
13. Computer "software" is generally associated with the programs that allow
computers to function, as opposed to the actual machine components which comprise
the computer "hardware." See Manifesto, supra note 7, at 2319. There is some ambi-
guity and overlap between the two terms. See infra notes 128-31 and accompanying
text.
14. Compare Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995)
(holding that menu component of computer program's user interface is unprotectable
under copyright law), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996) with
Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335 (5th Cir. 1994)
(holding that input formats of computer program's user interface is protected expres-
sion under the copyright law).
15. 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996).
16. Id. at 805. Justice Stevens took no part in the case, and the remaining eight
Justices could not agree on a majority opinion. Id.
2382 [Vol. 64
INTEROPERABILITY AND FAIR USE
the issue as well as the lack of consensus. 7 The Court, by default,
affirmed the appellate court ruling that the copyright law did not pro-
tect the system of menus and commands used in Lotus' spreadsheet
program 1-2-3. The deadlock was a major disappointment to lawyers,
judges, and commentators who had expected the Court to resolve the
confusion.' s
The trial court and court of appeals in the Lotus case took opposite
positions. The trial court focused on the importance of copyright pro-
tection for creative expression,' 9 whereas the court of appeals focused
on the importance of providing consumers with access to various pro-
grams through interoperability.20 While both opinions addressed im-
portant features of copyright law, neither reached a satisfactory result.
Instead the courts took positions that failed to effectively balance the
important competing interests at stake. The failure of both courts to
resolve the case properly demonstrates the need for a more complete
analysis of interoperability issues in copyright law.
This Note argues that a proper analysis of interoperability issues is
critical to the continuing viability of copyright's application to com-
puter software. It presents a method of evaluating interoperability
under the "fair use doctrine," which is an affirmative defense to a
claim of copyright infringement. This Note asserts that a proper eval-
uation of interoperability should identify the protected markets
served by the copyrighted work and the effect on those markets re-
sulting from the contested use. Using an approach that focuses on the
markets for computer software can provide for a proper evaluation of
whether a particular use of copyrighted material is a "fair use" or will
undermine the demand for the original. Where the market for a copy-
righted work is unfairly harmed by a particular use, copyright must
prohibit the use if it is to provide meaningful protection.
Part I introduces general principles and policies of copyright law
and the fair use doctrine. Part II discusses the expansion of copyright
law to cover computer programs, addressing the special requirements
of computer technology in this area. Part III evaluates the role of
interoperability in determining the scope of copyright protection for
computer programs. Part IV discusses the facts of Lotus and contrast
the district and circuit court opinions. Part V then evaluates the pro-
tection asserted by Lotus under current caselaw and applies the fair
use doctrine in a way that takes into account interoperability issues.
Part VI suggests some avenues for resolving the interoperability issues
17. Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Deadlocks In Key Case on Software, N.Y.
Tunes, Jan. 17, 1996, at D2.
18. Id.
19. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 799 F. Supp. 203,223 (D. Mass 1992), rev'd,
49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 116 S. C. 804 (1996).
20. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 49 F.3d 807, 817-18 (1st Cir. 1995), aff'd by
an equally divided Court, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996).
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raised by the Lotus case in a manner that is consistent with copyright
policy. Finally, this Note concludes that the use of protected elements
of computer programs that are necessary for interoperability should
be allowed under copyright law subject to a requirement that unfair
harm to the market for the "copyrighted work"'2 1 is minimized or
eliminated.
I. COPYRIGHT EXISTS TO PROTECT PUBLIC ACCESS TO CREATIVE
WORKS
The authority of copyright law to protect creative expression de-
rives directly from the Constitution and aims to promote the advance-
ment of the arts and sciences.' Copyright law advances this policy by
granting a temporary monopoly on an author's "expression" 23 in or-
der to reward the creative effort. The purpose of the copyright mo-
nopoly, however, is not specifically to reward authors, but instead to
benefit the public by providing authors with an incentive to create.24
Most fundamentally, copyright protection precludes the unauthor-
ized copying of the protected work.' It also gives the author an ex-
clusive right to prepare "derivative works. '26 A "derivative work" is
defined as one that is based on or developed from a preexisting work
or works.27 These rights vest upon the moment of creation.28
A claim under the copyright law depends on proof of two ele-
ments. 29 First, the plaintiff must show the ownership of a valid copy-
21. Although the works of both plaintiff and defendant in a copyright lawsuit are
typically protected by copyright, for purposes of this Note, the "copyrighted work"
will refer to the work of the party claiming infringement.
22. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("Congress shall have Power... [t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Tunes to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
23. The types of expression expressly covered by the copyright statutes include:
literary works, musical works, motion pictures, sound recordings, dramatic works,
choreographic works, sculptural works, and architectural works. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)
(1994). The monopoly granted by copyright reserves for the copyright holder primar-
ily the rights of reproduction (copying) and the preparation of derivative works. Id.
§ 106.
24. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); 1 Melville B. Nimmer & David
Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 1.03(A) (1995) [hereinafter Nimmer on Copyright]
(stating that the primary purpose of copyright protection is to secure the public bene-
fits of creative expression); see generally L. Ray Patterson & Stanley W. Lindberg,
The Nature of Copyright: A Law of Users' Rights 2 (1991) (describing the role and
purpose of copyright protection).
25. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1994).
26. Id. § 106(2).
27. Id. § 101 (defining derivative work as "a work based upon one or more preex-
isting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionaliza-
tion, motion picture version... which, as a whole, represent an original work of
authorship").
28. Rosen, supra note 3, at 775 (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 302(a) (1982)).
29. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
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right.30 Typically a plaintiff accomplishes this by producing a
certificate of copyright registration.31 Second, the plaintiff must show
copying by the defendant.32 If no direct evidence of copying is pres-
ent, the copyright owner can alternatively prove that the defendant
had access to the copyrighted work and that the two works are sub-
stantially similar.33
A. Limits on Copyright Protection
In order to keep the scope of the copyright monopoly reasonable,
several principles have evolved to deny copyright protection where
extending it would undermine the policy of benefitting the public. For
example, copyright protects the author's expression, but not any ideas
contained in that expression. 34 This distinction protects the right of
the public to build upon and use any ideas that are incorporated into
copyrighted expression.35
The distinction between what is an "expression" and what is an
"idea" is one that has troubled the courts for a long time. Over 100
years ago in the seminal case of Baker v. Selden,36 the Supreme Court
held that the copyright of a book describing a double entry accounting
system did not cover the "idea" of the system described in the book.37
Thus, the public was free to use the accounting system described in
the book, and the copyright protection granted to the book only
served to prohibit the copying of the book itself.38
Similar restrictions are found in the section of the copyright law that
precludes copyright protection for any "procedure, process, system,
[or] method of operation .. .regardless of the form in which it is
described. ' 39 For example, if a physician were to publish a book
describing the method of preparing a certain drug, the copyright of
the book would provide no exclusive right to manufacture or sell the
30. Id.
31. Although registration is not required for protection, it provides substantive
and procedural advantages such as statutory damages and attorney's fees. John B.
Koegel, BamboozlemenL The Repeal of Copyright Registration Incentives, 13 Car-
dozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 529, 531 (1995); I. Fred Koenigsberg, Copyrights, in Under-
standing Basic Copyright Law- 1995, at 22-23 (PLI Patents, Copyright, Trademark, &
Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. G4-3946, July 10, 1995). Registration is
accomplished by completing a form, paying a fee, and submitting deposit copies of the
work with the U.S. Copyright Office, a branch of the Library of Congress. Koegel,
supra, at 531-32.
32. Feist, 499 U.S. at 361.
33. Marvin N. Bern & Richard J. Superfine, § 117-The Right To Adapt Into the
Fourth Generation and The Source Code Generator's Dilemma, 12 J. Marshall J. Com-
puter & Info. L. 537, 550 (1994).
34. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 101-02 (1879).
35. See id.
36. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
37. Id. at 104.
38. Id.
39. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
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drug.4 ° These restrictions are consistent with copyright policy. For
copyright law to benefit the public, the public must remain free to use
the facts, ideas, and procedures that are embodied in a protected
work.4'
Other restrictions on copyright protection focus on the practical
problems that can arise from a grant of copyright protection. The
"merger doctrine" denies copyright protection where only a few ways
exist to express a particular idea.42 The theory is that because of the
limited ways of expressing the idea, the expression and the idea have
"merged," thus making a grant of copyright equivalent to a monopoly
on the idea.43 Using this reasoning, the Ninth Circuit denied copy-
right protection to the designer of a jeweled pin in the shape of a
bee.' Due to the limited number of ways to design such a pin, the
court found the idea and expression to have merged.45
Similarly, the scenes-d-faire doctrine withholds protection for ele-
ments that are customary or standard expressions in the treatment of
a given idea or topic. 46 For example, the copyright of a novel about a
particular historical era would not provide protection for descriptions
or features that were typical of that era.47
B. Fair Use As an Affirmative Defense
In addition to restrictions on the scope of protection granted by
copyright, the doctrine of "fair use '48 provides an affirmative defense
to the use of copyrighted material for certain purposes. The courts
created the doctrine in the mid-1800s to permit limited infringement
under the law, where the infringing work "serve[s] a specific public
interest in the progress of art or knowledge through transformative
creation of a new work. '49 The fair use doctrine provides a defense to
what would otherwise be prohibited, infringing conduct. 50
40. See Baker, 101 U.S. at 102-03.
41. See Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 5, at 323.
42. Jon S. )Wilkins, Note, Protecting Computer Programs as Compilations Under
Computer Associates v. Altai, 104 Yale L.i. 435, 438-39 (1994).
43. Id.
44. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir.
1971) (concluding that "[tihere is no greater similarity between the pins of plaintiff
and defendants than is inevitable from the use of jewel-encrusted bee forms in both").
45. Id.
46. Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 709 (2d Cir. 1992).
47. See Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 1980).
48. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
49. Karen S. Frank & Michael J. Higgins, Fair Use: In the Courts and Out of Con-
trol?, in Advanced Seminar on Copyright Law: 1995, at 5-6 (PLI Patents, Copyright,
Trademark, & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. G-411, 1995) [hereinafter
Frank & Higgins] (citing Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No.
4,901)). In fact, Justice Story held in Folsom that the defendant's work was not suffi-
ciently in the public interest to excuse the infringement, but the analysis used pro-
vided the basis for the development of the fair use doctrine. Id. at 6-7.
50. Id at 4.
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The fair use doctrine was codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107 as part of the
Copyright Act of 1976. 1 The statutory recognition of fair use was
intended to "'restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to
change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way.' "" The statute lists four
factors that should be balanced in determining whether a challenged
use is "fair":
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.53
If the disputed use is fair in light of these criteria, the defendant is not
liable for infringement.-'
The fair use doctrine only applies after a finding that the plaintiff's
material is protected ("copyrightable") and that the defendant has
copied the plaintiff's expression ("infringement"). 5 Thus, in the eval-
uation of a fair use defense, the focus shifts to the character and effect
of the defendant's use and away from the defendant's alleged copying.
Fair use analysis is an important component of copyright law. It
permits the application of copyright policy to cases where the fact of
copying is not in dispute, but the character of the contested use is one
that arguably furthers rather than undermines the goals of copyright.56
By preventing certain illogical outcomes, the fair use doctrine en-
hances the legitimacy and durability of the copyright statutes.
The early 1990s have seen an increase in the number of cases ad-
dressing the fair use doctrine. Historically, the doctrine was not avail-
able where the otherwise infringing use served a commercial purpose.
In Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,57 the Supreme Court
stated that "every commercial use of copyrighted material is presump-
51. Leo J. Raskind, The Uncertain Case for Special Legislation Protecting Com-
puter Software, 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1131, 1175 (1986).
52. William F. Patry, The Fair Use Privilege in Copyright Law 413 (2d ed.1995)
(quoting HR. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680).
53. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). Evaluation of a fair use defense is not necessarily lim-
ited to consideration of these four factors, and on occasion courts have considered
other relevant factors, such as the defendant's good faith. Patry, supra note 52, at 415
& n.14.
54. See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
55. Patry, supra note 52, at 413.
56. Cf. Raskind, supra note 51, at 1175 ("[U]se of protected material for purposes
of literary criticism and commentary, for news reporting, for classroom use and teach-
ing, and for scholarship and research constitutes a fair use.").
57. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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tively... unfair. '58 The presumption discussed by the Sony Court was
limited, if not eliminated, by the more recent fair use decision in
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. ,5 which stated: "If, indeed, com-
merciality carried presumptive force against a finding of fairness, the
presumption would swallow nearly all of [the rule]., 60 This shift in the
presumption against commercial uses has expanded the applicability
of the fair use defense, particularly in the area of consumer computer
software.
II. APPLICATION OF COPYRIGHT TO COMPUTER PROGRAMS
As new forms of communication technology develop, pressure is
put on the copyright law to adapt in a way that provides reasonable
protection for the new forms of expression. Modem copyright law has
evolved from Constitutional guidelines to cover motion pictures, rec-
ord albums, and compact disks.6' Computer technology is therefore
not unique in this respect. Nevertheless, the protection of computer
software under the copyright paradigm requires the courts to grapple
with certain distinctive issues.
This part discusses the adaptation of copyright law to cover com-
puter programs. Part II.A addresses the special characteristics of
computer programs under copyright law. Part II.B will discuss recent
cases that are shaping the scope and limitations of copyright protec-
tion in this area, and part II.C discusses the application of the fair use
defense in the computer software context.
A. Computer Programs: A Special Case
Little question exists that computer software demands some degree
of copyright protection.62 Designing and writing computer software
requires a high degree of creativity.63 Computer programs are also
generally designed to serve a particular purpose, and thus provide a
degree of utility that is different from most works of art and literature.
This utilitarian aspect distinguishes computer programs from other
works protected by copyright law. Additionally, computer software
must be able to operate in an environment that demands a high level
of cooperation between the hardware on which it runs and the user
who operates the software. As one court observed:
The problem presented by computer programs is fundamentally
different in one respect. The computer program is a means for caus-
ing something to happen; it has a mechanical utility, an instrumental
58. I& at 451.
59. 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
60. Id. at 1174.
61. National Research Council, Intellectual Property Issues in Software 12 (1991)
[hereinafter NRC].
62. See Nirmer & Krauthaus, supra note 5, at 320.
63. Id. at 321.
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role, in accomplishing the world's work.... Utility does not bar
copyright (dictionaries may be copyrighted), but it alters the
calculus.64
This incongruity between computer programs and the type of protec-
tion traditionally conceived under copyright requires a specialized ex-
amination of the type and scope of protection needed for computer
software.6 5
Although a great deal of creativity is incorporated into computer
software,6 6 functional and utilitarian considerations are also necessary
for software to achieve its desired purpose.67 Some commentators
have seized upon this problem as demonstrating the need for an en-
tirely new form of intellectual property protection applicable only to
the software arena.' By properly analyzing the scope of copyright
protection under existing principles of copyright law, however, courts
can eliminate the need to develop an entirely new body of law.69
In many ways the extension of copyright protection to computer
software was both necessary and inevitable.7 Computer software is
susceptible to easy and quick copying without any degradation be-
tween the copy and the original.71 As some commentators observed:
Copyright law, with its low threshold for protection and specific
prohibition against copying, was a natural response. Patent and
trade secret laws are inadequate because they require either main-
tained secrecy, which is inconsistent with mass markets, or an ad-
vanced degree of innovation, which is inconsistent with an
evolutionary industry involving many products.72
Copyright thus supplies an existing, accessible body of law for the pro-
tection of creative investment in computer software.
The earliest litigation involving copyright protected computer pro-
grams primarily addressed the easier case of exact copying of entire
programs.7 3 In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,74
the Third Circuit found that copyright prohibited wholesale copying
of a computer operating system program whether in "source" or "ob-
64. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 49 F.3d 807, 819 (1st Cir. 1995) (Boudin, J.,
concurring) (emphasis omitted), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 116 S. Ct. 804
(1996).
65. See NRC, supra note 61, at 12-13.
66. See Patry, supra note 52, at 519.
67. See, e.g., Clapes, supra note 2, at 22-23 (observing that a computer program
must be written to run on a particular type of computer).
68. See e.g., Manifesto, supra note 7, at 2364-65 (arguing in favor of the develop-
ment of a new legal regime to protect softuvare).
69. See Raskind, supra note 51, at 1182.
70. Ninmer & Krauthaus, supra note 5, at 328.
71. Id. at 328-29.
72. Id. at 329.
73. Id.
74. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
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ject" code format. Such cases are easier to evaluate because they
involve a direct theft of expression that fits well within the traditional
prohibitions of copyright law.
More recently, courts have been forced to examine the more diffi-
cult issues that arise in cases where the defendant's copying has been
(1) limited to specific program elements, or (2) directed at achieving
functionality or interoperability of computer products. The former set
of cases have focused primarily on distinguishing the protected and
the unprotected elements of plaintiff's work, a "copyrightability"
question.76 The second set of cases focus on the legitimacy of the
defendant's conduct in copying the plaintiff's work,77 a "fair use"
question. Although the two categories overlap to some extent,78 they
are different enough to warrant separate treatment.
B. Copyrightability-Whelan to Altai
The "literal" elements of computer programs include primarily the
"source" 79 code and the translated "object" code.80 These compo-
nents indisputably enjoy copyright protection. 81 Copying "nonliteral"
elements involves the copying of particular features, options, or ap-
pearances of another program. Copyright protection also extends to
some nonliteral elements; otherwise immaterial variations from the
original would allow a plagiarist to escape liability.82 Nonliteral copy-
ing of computer software has been more difficult to evaluate under
traditional principles of copyright law.83
The trend in the early 1980s was to provide expansive protection for
a program's nonliteral elements.' 4 In Whelan Associates v. Jaslow
Dental Laboratory, Inc.,85 a case that some commentators consider to
75. Id. at 1249. "Source code" indicates the human readable instructions actually
typed in by the programmer. "Object code" refers to the machine readable instruc-
tions that tell the computer how to behave. Id. at 1248. During a process called "com-
pilation," the source code is translated into object code so that the computer can
understand and perform the program instructions. See Clapes, supra note 2, at 63-64.
76. See Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 5, at 318 (using the terms "evidentiary"
and "liability" instead of "copyrightability" and "fair use").
77. Id.
78. For example, a court seeking to find for the defendant in a particular case may
accomplish that result by holding that the plaintiff's work is not protected, or alterna-
tively that infringement by the defendant is a fair use.
79. For a definition of "source" and "object" code, see supra note 75.
80. Wald, supra note 8, at 868.
81. Id.
82. The fear is that by inserting minor and unimportant differences in a copied
work, the copying will not be prohibited by copyright law. See Nichols v. Universal
Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
83. Wald, supra note 8, at 875.
84. Pamela Samuelson, Counterpoint: An Entirely New Legal Regime is Needed,
12 Computer Law. 11, 11 (1995) [hereinafter Samuelson, Counterpoint].
85. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
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be the "high-water mark" of copyright protection,86 the Third Circuit
held that the general purpose or function of a computer program con-
stituted the program's "idea." s The court then reasoned that every-
thing else "necessary to effecting that function" would constitute
protected expression.88 The result was a rule that found only one un-
protected idea in each program.19
The one idea per program principle described in Whelan came
under heavy criticism as providing too much protection for a pro-
gram's nonliteral elements. 90 Critics argued that "[t]he crucial flaw in
[the Whelan] reasoning is that it assumes only one 'idea,' in copyright
law terms.... The broad purpose that a programs serves... is an idea.
Other elements of the program structure and design, however, may
also constitute ideas for copyright purposes." 91
Courts responded to these criticisms by narrowing the scope of pro-
tection.92 In Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,9
the Second Circuit set forth what is considered "the leading test of
software copyright infringement."'  One commentator observed that
"although the Third Circuit ... has yet to comment on Altai, every
other court to consider the issue has endorsed at least some aspects of
the Altai approach."' The Altai test consists of three steps described
as "abstraction", "filtration", and "comparison."'  Under Altai, the
copyrightability question is determined by the first two steps of ab-
straction and filtration, both of which strip the plaintiff's work of ele-
ments unprotected by copyright.97 Whatever remains after the first
two steps is then compared to the allegedly infringing work to deter-
mine liability.98
86. Wald, supra note 8, at 875.
87. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236.
88. Id.
89. See Willdns, supra note 42, at 442 n.36.
90. See 3 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 24, § 13.03[F] at 13-126-28, 131-33;
Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application
Programs, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1045, 1074 (1989).
91. 3 Nimmer on Copyright, § 13.03[F], at 13-131-32.
92. Wald, supra note 8, at 876-78.
93. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
94. Wilkins, supra note 42, at 435.
95. See Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism
Intellectual Property Implications of "Lock-Out" Programs, 68 S. Cal. L Rev. 1091,
1141 (1995). Courts adopting the Second Circuit Altai test include the Fifth Circuit in
Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1342-43 (5th
Cir. 1994), the Tenth Circuit in Autoskill Inc. v. National Educational Systems, Inc.,
994 F.2d 1476, 1490-91 (10th Cir. 1993), and the Ninth Circuit in Sega Enterprises
Ltd. v. Accolade Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1524 (9th Cir. 1992).
96. Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706-12 (2d Cir. 1992).
97. See Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs,
Databases, and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106
Harv. L. Rev. 977, 1002 (1993).
98. Id. at 1002-03.
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"Abstraction" determines the scope of protection that copyright af-
fords to particular program elements by separating the unprotected
ideas from the protected expression. 99 It determines where along the
spectrum of ideas and expressions a particular program element
lies.' The "filtration" step then filters out any elements that are un-
protected for reasons of merger, scdnes-d-faire, and the like.''
Whatever is left following the first two steps is therefore protected
expression. The final "comparison" step compares the protected por-
tions to the challenged work to see if there is a substantial similarity
between the two.1°2
One drawback of the Altai approach is that courts may find it diffi-
cult to apply consistently. 1 3 Many of the issues addressed in the three
stages involve complex analyses on a case-by-case basis.1°4 Some
commentators also criticize the method as providing insufficient pro-
tection for valuable elements of computer software. 10 5 The superior-
ity of the Altai approach, however, lies in its provision of the
necessary sophistication to identify and address the difficult questions
raised by the copyrightability of nonliteral elements of computer
programs.
C. Fair Use
Another area of copyright law that has recently developed in the
context of computer programs is the fair use doctrine. Fair use is " 'a
privilege in others than the owner of the copyright to use the copy-
righted material in a reasonable manner without [the owner's] con-
sent.' "o106 In essence, fair use is excusable copyright infringement.
A number of circuit court opinions have expanded the scope of the
fair use doctrine to accommodate new issues raised by cases involving
copyrighted computer game programs. One category of these cases
has addressed the process of "reverse engineering."' 0 7 Reverse engi-
99. Altai, 982 F.2d at 706-07.
100. See id.
101. Id. at 707-10.
102. Id. at 710-11.
103. See, e.g., Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., No. 93-3234, 1995 WL 757786 at *5-7
(11th Cir. Dec. 22, 1995) (holding that the district court failed to properly instruct the
jury on the applicability and scope of the Altai test); Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v.
Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1343 n. 10 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting the difficulty
of applying the abstraction method).
104. See, e.g., Bateman, 1995 WL 757786, at *8 (criticizing the district court for
failing to adequately define terms in the jury instructions that were necessary for
resolving the case).
105. Miller, supra note 97, at 1004-05 (arguing that the Altai test has the potential
to improperly filter out the most expressive components of a computer program
where a programmer has captured the most effective way of communicating an idea).
106. Frank & Higgins, supra note 49, at 4 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985)).
107. Reverse Engineering involves the translation of machine readable "object"
code back into human readable "source" code (a process known as "decompiling")
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neering describes the process of figuring out the internal operation of
a computer program by examining, decompiling, and using the pro-
gram.108 A software developer often needs to reverse engineer an-
"other designer's program in order to design a product that is
technically compatible with it.
In Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.," a case that addressed
reverse engineering, the Ninth Circuit held that the fair use doctrine
allowed the defendant Accolade to make unauthorized copies of
plaintiff's programs in order to figure out how to make its own game
cartridges compatible with the plaintiff's Genesis home video game
system." 0 The Sega court noted the importance of considering "the
public benefit resulting from a particular use notwithstanding the fact
that the alleged infringer may gain commercially." '' Thus, the pro-
cess of reverse engineering was sanctioned by the court for limited
purposes aimed at achieving interoperability.12
The Sega court based its holding primarily on two conclusions.
First, the court decided that the public benefitted from copying to fa-
cilitate interoperability between Accolade's games and the Genesis
system." 3 Second, the court concluded that Accolade's copying
would result in no direct harm to the market for Sega's games.' 4 On
this point the court stated:
Accolade's [copying] has led to an increase in the number of inde-
pendently designed video game programs offered for use with the
Genesis console. It is precisely this growth in creative expression
... that the Copyright Act was intended to promote.
[V]ideo game users typically purchase more than one game.... In
any event, an attempt to monopolize the market by making it im-
possible for others to compete runs counter to the statutory purpose
of promoting creative expression .... 5
for the purposes of gaining a better understanding of the internal operation of a com-
puter program. Patry, supra note 52, at 468. It necessarily requires the making of an
unauthorized "copy" of the program. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade Inc., 977 F.2d
1510, 1518-19 (9th Cir. 1992).
108. Patry, supra note 52, at 468.
109. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
110. Id. at 1527-28. Around the same time, the Federal Circuit adopted the same
reasoning and stated that reverse engineering from a legitimately obtained copy is a
fair use. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
111. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523.
112. Id. at 1527-28.
113. Id. at 1527.
114. Id. at 1523-24.
115. Id. The Sega ruling was cited approvingly by the Supreme Court in Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct 1164, 1174 (1994).
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Thus, the court rejected the argument that the use of copyrighted ma-
terial to achieve interoperability and produce a competing product
could never be a fair use. 116
Another case that expanded the scope of the fair use doctrine in the
context of computer software is Lewis Galoob Toys v. Nintendo of
America."7 Galoob manufactured a device called the "Game Genie"
which the user interposed between the game cartridge and the video
game console for the purpose of changing the performance of the
games. By using the Game Genie, a player could, among other things,
increase the number of lives of a particular video game character." 8
Nintendo sued Galoob alleging contributory copyright infringe-
ment. Nintendo asserted that Galoob was selling the Game Genie
with the knowledge and intention that consumers would use it to mod-
ify the behavior of Nintendo's games. 1 9 Under Nintendo's theory,
the modified games were unauthorized "derivative works" 20 based on
the original game programs. Although the Court of Appeals doubted
the merit of Nintendo's derivative work theory,12 ' it held that even
assuming that the changes made to the game did amount to an unau-
thorized derivative work, any infringement arising thereby would be a
fair use.' 22
The relevance of the Galoob reasoning to interoperability issues
should not be missed. Like the Game Genie, many computer pro-
grams interact with preexisting works."z For example, a spell-check
program must interact with a word processing program. A word
processor document must interact with word processing programs.
Such interaction may at times implicate the copyright laws. Under
Galoob, the most important fair use evaluation appears to be the ef-
fect on the market for the preexisting work.' 24
As these cases point out, technological issues that are unique to
computer programs require that copyright analysis include accommo-
dation for certain uses of copyrighted material. This circumstance de-
mands that the fair use doctrine be flexible enough to adapt to this
new environment. As one commentator has noted: "Fair use is an
116. Patry, supra note 52, at 469-70.
117. 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1582 (1993).
118. Lewis Galoob Toys v. Nintendo of Am., 780 F. Supp. 1283, 1289 n.2 (N.D.Cal.
1991).
119. See id. at 1286-89.
120. A "derivative work" is a work that is based at least in part on another work. 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1994). The right to create a derivative work requires authorization from
the original copyright holder. Id. § 106 (2); see supra notes 26-27 and accompanying
text.
121. Galoob, 964 F.2d at 969.
122. Id. at 969-72.
123. See Pamela Samuelson, Fair Use for Computer Programs and Other Copyright-
able Works in Digital Form The Implications of Sony, Galoob and Sega, 1 J. Intell.
Prop. L. 49, 102, 112 (1993) [hereinafter Samuelson, Fair Use].
124. See id. at 78.
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'equitable rule of reason' of general application for mediating between
the interests of consumers and of copyright owners as to uses that can
be made of the protected work."'' 1 Courts must adapt this principle
to the context of interoperability of computer software in a way that
gives effect to the basic principles underlying copyright.
Ill. INTEROPERABILITY AND ITS ROLE IN COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
FOR COMPUTER PROGRAMS
Computer programs are not like other copyrighted literary works,
such as books, because computer programs must work together with
other programs and machines to bring about the desired result. 26 A
critically important task of software development is to design informa-
tion flow in a manner that allows the user to achieve the objective.1 7
If, for example, a program is written so that it cannot interoperate
with the computer on which it runs, its usefulness is frustrated. Where
the various components that allow for interoperation may be subject
to copyright protection, the potential threat is that copyright will in-
hibit the advancement of science and the arts by preventing software
designers from achieving interoperability. This section describes dif-
ferent types of interoperability. It will then evaluate the impact that
interoperability issues can have on the software markets through the
operation of copyright law.
A. Different Types of Interoperability
Interoperability requirements take many different forms. The most
obvious of these is the ability of a particular program (software) to
run on a particular machine (hardware). 1 This ability can be under-
stood as "hardware-software" interoperability. Similarly, some pro-
grams must be able to interoperate with other programs.' 29 For a
spell-checking program to be useful, it must be able to work together
with a word processor.130 This ability could be similarly understood as
"software-software" interoperability.
Emphasis on the hardware-software distinction can be misleading,
however, because "[a]ny behavior that can be accomplished with one
can also be accomplished with the other.' 131 Video game cartridges
provide a good example. Although in some sense the cartridges are
125. Id. at 99 (emphasis added); see also Raskind, supra note 51, at 1182 ("[1]t is
possible that the fair use doctrine could be adapted to serve as an arbiter between
permissible use of protected software consistent with the public interest in technologi-
cal progress and impermissible piracy.").
126. Manifesto, supra note 7, at 2320-21.
127. Id. at 2321.
128. See Clapes, supra note 2, at 22-23, 174.
129. Id. at 174-75.
130. See Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., 964 F.2d 965, 969 (9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. CL 1582 (1993).
131. Manifesto, supra note 7, at 2319.
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"hardware," they also constitute the type of computer program that is
ordinarily associated with "software."132 To the video game user, of
course, the distinction is irrelevant.
Other forms of interoperability go beyond mere technical compati-
bility. The ability of a user of a particular program to employ the
same skills and experience to operate a different but similar program
might be understood as "user-software" interoperability.'33
One example of user-software interoperability occurs when pro-
grams accept documents created by the user's operation of other pro-
grams. If an author can access and manipulate the same document in
a number of different word processing programs, then the word
processors are interoperable with the author's document. Conversely,
a word processing program that cannot access the author's document
is not interoperable with it.34
This interoperability principle also applies to other forms of user
created documents such as spreadsheet documents or software
"macros." A "macro" is a computer program that is designed to
shorten repetitive tasks that are frequently performed.135 For exam-
ple, a program user might create a macro that caused the word proces-
sor to translate all footnotes in a particular document into endnotes.
The ability to use the macro on a variety of different word processors
could have significant value to the user. 36
Another example of user-software interoperability involves the
ability of a certain program to "emulate" or behave similarly to an-
other program so that the user does not need to learn a new set of
skills when using the second program. 37 Programs that have similar
132. For a brief description of hardware and software, see supra note 13.
133. See Clapes, supra note 2, at 175-76 (discussing the "interaction between a pro-
gram and its end user").
134. The ability to access different kinds of documents usually takes two forms.
Either the document is translated into the "native" format of the program for manip-
ulation (translation), or the program interprets any differences between the actual
document format and the program's native format (interpretation). There is some
authority that copyright should treat such approaches differently. See, e.g., Lotus Dev.
Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 69 (D. Mass. 1990) (distinguishing
Microsoft's "Macro Translation Assistant" from Paperback's macro interpreter). It
seems illogical to argue that copyright law distinguishes between these approaches
because of the number of steps employed to achieve the same result.
135. Clapes, supra note 2, at 72. A "macro" is a kind of computer program written
by the program user which speeds up the performance of routine or repetitive tasks
by recording a series of menu actions and playing them back upon command. Paper-
back, 740 F. Supp. at 64.
136. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 49 F.3d 807, 809-10 (1st Cir. 1995)
(discussing the benefits of macros in the context of computer spreadsheets), aff'd by
an equally divided Court, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996).
137. See, e.g., Lotus, 49 F.3d at 810 (discussing the "Lotus Emulation Interface"
that allowed the users of one spreadsheet program to apply their knowledge to an-
other spreadsheet program).
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"user interfaces" 138 attempt to capitalize on this learning by providing
a level of familiarity to the user.' 39 Once a computer user has dedi-
cated a significant amount of time to learning a particular program,
for the user to operate a similar but differently conceived program is
wasteful and inefficient."4
For copyright to provide the proper scope of protection for com-
puter programs, courts must properly address these interoperability
issues. If copyright fails to account properly for interoperability, the
markets for computer programs will suffer from failures that arise
from overprotection and underprotection of copyrighted works. 4 '
B. Overprotection and Underprotection
The goal of copyright is to advance the progress of science and the
arts.142 Copyright serves this goal by protecting creative expression
against unauthorized copying. If creative works received no protec-
tion, the incentive to create would be inadequate, and the amount of
creative activity would decline.' 43 By contrast, an overbroad scope of
copyright protection including, for example, the protection of ideas,
would stifle the creative process and preclude people from building
upon the creations of others.'"
This general principle of intellectual property law is especially true
in the world of computer programs. If too little protection is granted
for computer programs, the incentive to develop new products is dras-
tically reduced because the reward is gone. 45 The effect would be
magnified in the computer context due to the ease with which com-
puter programs can be copied.' 46 If copyright protected only the pro-
gramming code, a successful program might quickly be driven out of
138. The term "user interface" describes the way that the user interacts with a par-
ticular program. It includes the appearance of information on the screen, the method
of inputing data, the descriptions of program operation, and the method of controlling
the program behavior. Clapes, supra note 2, at 91-92.
139. See id.
140. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 817-18.
141. See Manifesto, supra note 7, at 2356-57.
142. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cL 8.
143. Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure and the Prisoner's Dilemma in
Intellectual Property, 17 U. Dayton L. Rev. 853, 854 (1992).
144. See Wilkins, supra note 42, at 438-39.
145. To the extent that new products are developed, the motivation to hide or hold
back the valuable information contained in a computer program by any technological
means possible would be quite strong. As a result, the ability to build on the discover-
ies of others would also be reduced. See, e.g., filler, supra note 97, at 1005 & n. 132
(arguing that a narrow scope of protection can preclude copyright coverage for the
most successfully expressive components of computer programs).
146. See Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 5, at 328-29.
1996] 2397
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
the market by low cost "clones"' 47 developed with "relatively trivial
effort." 148
Conversely, the overprotection of computer programs also runs a
significant risk of causing market failures. 49 If one software manufac-
turer is granted a copyright monopoly in a way that precludes other
competitors from entering the market in any form, the level of crea-
tive development would similarly decline. In addition, product de-
signers would have an incentive to develop products that did not work
with the products of other manufacturers in the hope of leveraging an
existing monopoly into other markets, such as the markets for comple-
mentary hardware and software.' 50 Eventually, the utility enjoyed by
the public would significantly decline.
The health of the computer industry depends on maintaining a level
of copyright protection that both encourages and rewards develop-
ment, but does not excessively restrict the development of new prod-
ucts that build upon or advance the creations of the past.
Interoperability issues play a central role in this regard.1 5 '
C. Interoperability, Fair Use, and Efficient Markets
Copyright protection serves as a market-correcting mechanism that
guarantees a reward for creative development. 52 When copyright is
applied to a new form of expressive technology, the law must adapt in
a way that continues to protect the markets for both new and existing
expression. Courts should therefore evaluate interoperability issues
from a market-oriented perspective. 153
147. A "clone" is a program that duplicates all of the functionality of another pro-
gram without duplicating any of the programming code. See Clapes, supra note 2, at
153-55.
148. Manifesto, supra note 7, at 2379. The effect of clones in the market can lead to
an additional cost arising from the underprotection of computer software and the
resulting lack of innovation. This cost arises where the consumers of computer pro-
grams become too attached to an outmoded "standard" that no longer represents the
most efficient method of accomplishing a certain result. For example, the QWERTY
typewriter keyboard was originally advantageous because it restrained the speed of
typists to a rate that could be accommodated by the old mechanical typewriters. The
lack of innovation in this area has resulted in a standard keyboard that is inefficiently
serving modem needs. See Joseph Farrell, Standardization and Intellectual Property,
30 Jurimetrics J. 35, 37-38 (1989).
149. One commentator observed that the danger of overprotection is greater in the
area of utilitarian works such as computer programs. Jonathan Band, Lotus v. Bor-
land Through the Lens of Interoperability, 12 Computer Law. 1, 5 (June 1995).
150. Frederick R. Warren-Boulton et al., Point: Copyright Protection of Software
Can Make Economic Sense, 12 Computer Law. 10, 19-20 (Feb. 1995).
151. Band, supra note 149, at 6-7.
152. See Manifesto, supra note 7, at 2369-70; see also Gordon, supra note 143, at
853-54 (presenting two different economic models that underlie intellectual property
protection).
153. Some commentators who argue for a market-oriented approach to software
protection also argue that only sui generis protection can adequately address the pro-
tection requirements of computer programs. The Manifesto Concerning the Legal
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The fair use doctrine is a necessary element of this debate for a
number of reasons." Often, a court's evaluation does not end with a
finding that plaintiff's expression is protected and defendant copied it,
rather, the analysis begins at that point.' 55 The fair use doctrine not
only recognizes this fact, it is based on it.'5 6 The doctrine also ex-
pressly addresses the policies and market considerations that are at
the heart of copyright law.' 7
The copying of nonliteral elements of copyrighted computer pro-
grams may have a number of different effects on the markets for the
copyrighted work. In some cases, these effects may tend to under-
mine the market for the original, and therefore defeat the policy goals
of copyright.5 8 By contrast, other uses may further the goals of copy-
right by enhancing public benefit.'5 9 Thus, the primary issue in these
interoperability cases should be the effect of the use, not the copying
itself. 60
This Note argues that interoperability uses may serve to increase
public utility, and proposes a market-oriented approach to determine
if such uses should be prohibited.' 6' If a contested use facilitates in-
teroperability and does not unfairly impact on the market for the
copyrighted work, the use should be sanctioned under the fair use
doctrine. Conversely, where the contested use directly harms the
market for the copyrighted work, copyright law must prevent the use
Protection of Computer Programs, supra note 7, argues that the special characteristics
of computer programs are "obscured by the issues that copyright doctrine seems to
demand." IL at 2429.
The need for or advisability of sui generis protection for computer programs has
been questioned by several other authors who support both a market-oriented ap-
proach, and are confident that existing principles of copyright can be adapted to prop-
erly address the new issues raised by protecting computer programs under copyright.
See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Four Reasons and a Paradox: The Manifest Superiority of
Copyright Over Sui Generis Protection of Computer Software, 94 Colum. L Rev 2559
(1994) (arguing that both practical and substantive reasons mitigate against creating a
sui generis form of protection for computer programs); filler, supra note 97, at 1034-
36 (arguing against the suitability of sui generis protection for computer software);
Raskind, supra note 51, at 1182 (arguing in support of the fair use doctrine as a pref-
erable substitute for sui generis protection).
154. See Raskind, supra note 51, at 1175.
155. See e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp v. Borland Int'l, 49 F.3d 807, 812 (1st Cir. 1995)
(noting that the defendant did not dispute the fact of copying, but contended that
such copying was lawful), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996).
156. See Patry, supra note 52, at 413 (noting that the fair use defense is "relevant
only after there has been a prima facie showing of infringement").
157. 17 U.S.C § 107(1), (4) (1994).
158. See Manifesto, supra note 7, at 2379-80 (pointing out that where important
program elements can be copied without restriction, the result is destruction of the
markets for the original work).
159. Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding that the use of copyrighted material supports a public policy).
160. See Raskind, supra note 51, at 1133 n.5.
161. See infra part V.
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if the law is to provide any meaningful protection to computer
software.
IV. THE LOTUS CASE FROM AN INTEROPERABILITY PERSPECTIVE
The case of Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International,162
which recently resulted in a 4-4 deadlock in the Supreme Court,163
provides an excellent context in which to explore interoperability is-
sues in copyright law and the fair use doctrine. Observers expected
the case to be a tremendously important decision, one many thought
would "determine the future of the software industry."'" When Jus-
tice Stevens recused himself, however, the remaining eight justices
could not reach an opinion. 65 As a result of the deadlock, the future
of this area of law is uncertain. This section will discuss the facts of
Lotus, and the district and circuit court opinions. It will then contrast
the different considerations upon which each opinion was based.
Lotus Development Corp., creator of the popular spreadsheet 1-2-3,
filed the case in 1990 against Borland International, creator of a com-
peting spreadsheet program called Quattro Pro.166 Borland intro-
duced Quattro Pro in 1989, and the program enjoyed a positive
reception by the software industry. 167 In the words of Gary Reback,
Borland's counsel, "Quattro Pro ...won every major award for
spreadsheet excellence . . . [and] invariably ranked substantially
higher than 1-2-3 in head-to-head reviews and user comparisons, in-
cluding those conducted by Lotus.' 68
Lotus contested two features of Quattro Pro, both of which re-
quired incorporating copies of the 1-2-3 menu system into Quattro
Pro. First, Quattro Pro included a feature called the "Lotus Emula-
tion Interface,' 69 which allowed Quattro Pro users to employ a copy
of the 1-2-3 menu in Quattro Pro. Quattro Pro's designers included
this option as an alternative to Quattro Pro's own menu system. They
intended the option to make Quattro Pro more attractive to existing
1-2-3 users who wanted the extra functionality but did not want to
162. 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996).
163. Id.
164. Victoria Slind-Flor, High Court Spends Snowy Session Hearing IP Cases, Nat'l
LJ., Jan. 22, 1996, at B1 ("The stakes are astronomically high for the multibillion-
dollar software industry, which desperately needs to know the nature and size of the
legal obstacles to developing product compatibility ....
165. Lotus, 116 S. Ct. at 804.
166. Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Deadlocks In Key Case on Software, N.Y.
Tines, Jan. 17, 1996, at D2.
167. Gary L. Reback, Implications of Lotus v. Borland, in Computer Software and
the Internet, at 169 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course
Handbook Series No. G4-3953, 1995).
168. Id.
169. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 49 F.3d 807, 810 (1st Cir. 1995), aff'd by an
equally divided Court, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996).
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learn to use a new spreadsheet program.1 70 Second, Lotus also con-
tested the Quattro Pro "Key Reader" feature, which allowed macros
written by 1-2-3 users to run on Quattro Pro to the same effect. 171
The 1-2-3 menu system, like all computer program menus, allows
the spreadsheet user to access the functions that the 1-2-3 program
can perform by using a keyboard or a mouse. Specifically, the 1-2-3
menu system covers 469 commands, which are arranged into over fifty
menus and submenus.17 Borland admitted using the 1-2-3 menu, but
contended that either the menu was outside the protection of copy-
right or that the use was fair.173
The district and circuit court opinions took opposing views of Bor-
land's use of the 1-2-3 menu. The district court concluded that the 1-
2-3 menu was properly within the scope of Lotus' copyright and that
Borland had infringed that copyright. 74 The circuit court reversed,
holding that the 1-2-3 menu was an unprotectable "method of opera-
tion."175 Both opinions addressed important issues in copyright, but
neither was able to reconcile the opposing considerations. The follow-
ing subparts will discuss each opinion in detail.
A. The District Court Opinion
The district court evaluated the 1-2-3 menu system primarily from
the perspective of the menu emulation. 176 Because copyright does not
protect ideas, but only the expression of ideas,'" the district court saw
the case as turning on the separation of the protected expressions
from the unprotected ideas. 7 1
The district court held that because of the great variety of ways that
a programmer could set up a system of menu commands in a spread-
sheet program, the particular choices made by the programmer would
170. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 820 (Boudin, J., concurring).
171. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 831 F. Supp. 223,226 (D. Mass. 1993), rev'd,
49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996).
Both 1-2-3 and Quattro Pro include sophisticated macro programming languages in-
tended to enhance the functionality provided by the user's menu of commands. See,
e.g., Lotus Development Corporation, User's Guide: Lotus 1-2-3 Release 4 Spread-
sheet for Windows 303-25 (1993) (describing the use and functionality of the 1-2-3
macro programming system).
172. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 809.
173. Lotus, 831 F. Supp. at 229, 240. Borland also asserted the defenses of waiver,
laches, and estoppel, which failed in the District Court and will not be considered
here. Id. at 235-40
174. Id. at 245.
175. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 819.
176. See Band, supra note 149, at 3 (noting the court's focus on 1-2-3's "command
structures").
177. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879); supra notes 34-41 and accompa-
nying text.
178. See Band, supra note 149, at 3.
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be protected expression.' 79 Under the approach taken by the district
court, if an author has alternative ways of creating the expression, that
expression is protectable.180 Conversely, if only a limited number of
practical ways of expressing a particular idea exist, the merger doc-
trine' 8' prohibits copyright protection. For example, a menu that in-
cluded only two commands, "Print" and "Exit," would not be
protectable under the merger doctrine.
The 1-2-3 menu included 469 commands in over fifty menus and
sub-menus creatively designed to represent complicated concepts in a
way that the user would find accessible. The district court therefore
concluded that the idea and expression had not merged and that copy-
right protected the expression."8 Accordingly, the court enjoined
Borland from selling any version of Quattro Pro that included either
the menu emulation or the macro compatibility. 83
In its decision, the district court rejected Borland's arguments that
related to their defense of fair use.18' Significantly, the court con-
cluded that the fact that the 1-2-3 menu system may have become a de
facto standard for spreadsheet menus would enhance rather than di-
minish the argument for copyright protection. 18 5 It reasoned that per-
mitting protectable expression to lose its copyright protection by
virtue of its success in the marketplace would be perverse. 18 6 Because
commercially successful expression is the most likely to suffer from
risks of infringement by competing products, the court concluded that
it should view with considerable skepticism any argument for denial of
protection on the grounds of commercial success. 187
The district court considered only two players, Lotus and Borland,
as relevant to its decision. It viewed any investment by the user of the
software in the form of learning the menus and writing macros as fall-
ing within the scope of the copyright protection originally granted to
the 1-2-3 program." 8 Thus, the district court concluded that the fact
that the widespread use of a particular program may result in a de
facto industry standard only implicates the success of the expressions
179. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 831 F. Supp. 202, 215 (D. Mass. 1993), rev'd,
49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996).
180. Band, supra note 149, at 3.
181. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
182. Lotus, 831 F. Supp. at 233.
183. Id. at 245.
184. Id.
185. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37,79 (D. Mass
1990). The Paperback case was a prior case involving copyright protection of the 1-2-
3 program, which was decided by Judge Keeton of the District of Massachusetts, who
also presided over the Lotus v. Borland trial. ld. at 37.
186. Id. at 79; see also Band, supra note 149, at 3 ("Copyright should reward crea-
tivity, .. . not penalize it.").
187. See Band, supra note 149, at 3.
188. Id. at 3-4.
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contained in that product, and not any investment by the program
users.
B. The Circuit Court Opinion
On March 9, 1995, the First Circuit reversed the district court, hold-
ing that the 1-2-3 menu is not protectable under copyright law.'89 It
held that the 1-2-3 menu structure was an unprotected "method of
operation" under § 102(b) 191 of the Copyright Act.191 It rejected the
district court argument that the large variety of ways to construct a
spreadsheet menu meant that the expression was protectable. 1'
Underlying the decision was an understanding of the interoper-
ability issues raised by Borland's use of the 1-2-3 menu, particularly in
the context of the macro compatibility. The circuit court distinguished
between the areas over which copyright is supposed to grant a monop-
oly and the areas over which it is not. It recognized that prohibiting
Borland's use of the 1-2-3 menu structure to allow Quattro Pro to play
user-created macros would essentially expand the scope of the 1-2-3
copyright into an area of expression that belonged entirely to the user
who created the macro. 93 The circuit court also recognized the im-
portance of the user investment in learning the 1-2-3 menu and incor-
porating it into macros, stating that "[u]nder Lotus's theory, if a user
uses several different programs, he or she must learn how to perform
the same operation in a different way for each program used.... We
find this absurd."' 9 Accordingly, the circuit court denied all copy-
right protection to the 1-2-3 menu.195
V. A MARKET-ORIENTED APPROACH TO LOTUS V. BORLAND
This part analyzes Lotus from an interoperability perspective, ac-
counting for both the infringement concerns of the district court and
interoperability concerns expressed by the circuit court. Part V.A ar-
gues that the circuit court was incorrect in holding that the 1-2-3 menu
is an unprotectable method of operation. Part V.B evaluates the pro-
tectability of the 1-2-3 menu using the Altai test, concluding that the
district court was correct in holding that the 1-2-3 menu is copyright-
189. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 49 F.3d 807, 819 (1st Cir. 1995), aff'd by an
equally divided Court, 116 S. CL 804 (1996).
190. Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act provides:
In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship ex-
tend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation ... re-
gardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work.
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
191. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 816.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 818.
194. Id. at 817-18.
195. Id. at 815.
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able subject matter. Finally, part V.C applies the fair use doctrine in a
manner that addresses the interoperability issues raised by the facts of
Borland's use of the 1-2-3 menu.
A. The 1-2-3 Menus Are Not Buttons
In the process of reaching its reversal of the district court, the First
Circuit drew an analogy between the 1-2-3 menu commands and the
buttons on the front of a video cassette recorder ("VCR"). The court
stated:
Just as one could not operate a buttonless VCR, it would be impos-
sible to operate Lotus 1-2-3 without employing its menu command
hierarchy. Thus the Lotus command terms are not equivalent to the
labels on the VCR's buttons, but are instead equivalent to the but-
tons themselves.... Without the menu commands, there would be
no way to "push" the Lotus buttons, as one could push unlabeled
VCR buttons.196
According to the court, this analogy supports its argument that the 1-
2-3 menu system is in fact an "uncopyrightable 'method of opera-
tion.' "'9 This analogy is incorrect. The protection sought involves
the 1-2-3 labels, and not the buttons themselves.
Just as two different VCRs perform many identical functions, no
dispute existed that 1-2-3 and Quattro Pro perform many identical
functions. Lotus did not argue that the Quattro Pro menu buttons
themselves cannot access functions identical to those of 1-2-3. If that
were so, Lotus could have brought suit against any spreadsheet manu-
facturer on the ground that the "buttons" of all spreadsheet programs
often duplicate 1-2-3 functions. 198 Lotus in fact argued that the but-
196. Id. at 817.
197. Id. at 815. In some sense, the court apparently relied on the plain meaning of
the words "method of operation" to justify their holding. They stated that "[t]he Lo-
tus menu command hierarchy provides the means by which users control and operate
Lotus 1-2-3." Id. This plain-meaning interpretation of the words "method of opera-
tion" is incorrect. In the same sense, a computer operating system program is also a
method of operation with regard to the machine that it operates, yet computer oper-
ating system programs are clearly protected by copyright. See Apple Computer, Inc.
v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1250-51 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464
U.S. 1033 (1984). For copyright purposes, it should not matter whether an expressive
element of a computer program also happens to be a method of operating that com-
puter program. This type of literal interpretation of terms of art should generally be
viewed with some skepticism, particularly in the area of copyright law. See, e.g., Lotus
Development Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 56-58 (D. Mass.
1990) (declining to employ a literal interpretation of the "useful article" provision in
the copyright statutes).
198. To prevent such a result, the copyright law includes an exception for "useful
articles" or "utilitarian objects" that would preclude copyright protection for "menu
commands," "mouse buttons," and the like. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining "useful
article"); see Paperback, 740 F. Supp. at 54-55.
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tons accessing identical functions in Quattro Pro may not feature the
identical labels as the buttons in 1-2-3.199
Undoubtedly, the 1-2-3 menu designers sought to identify and or-
ganize the 469 functions of the spreadsheet in a way that communi-
cates their purpose and use most effectively to the user. A successful
menu system demands a significant amount of originality, effort, and
expense to design.2"0 Indeed, the ease with which a complicated com-
puter program such as a spreadsheet can be learned and used carries
considerable weight in the consumer's purchasing decision.20 1 A term
often used to describe this factor is "user friendliness." 2m
Despite Borland's stated goal of facilitating interoperability, the po-
tential is present that the use of the 1-2-3 menu could result in a free
ride for Quattro Pro users who find that the 1-2-3 menu is easier to
work with than the Quattro Pro menu.20 3 Consumers may view Quat-
tro Pro as providing two programs for the price of one. When viewed
in this light, Lotus's claim of infringement does not seem as disingenu-
ous as the First Circuit suggested.
Under the circuit court's reasoning, nothing requires a competitor
even to bother to offer its own menu in addition to including the Lo-
tus menu. Under this "method of operation" rule, any program that
has enjoyed success in the marketplace is open to duplication of its
unique system of menus without the remedy of an infringement law-
suit. A hypothetical competitor could even legally market its product
as "like Lotus-only cheaper," by virtue of the menu compatibility.
This was the case in Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback Software
International, where Paperback was marketing a spreadsheet pro-
gram called VP-Planner, which was "publicly advertised as a
'workalike for 1-2-3.' "205 In fact, the VP-Planner manual declared:
"VP-Planner is designed to work like Lotus 1-2-3, keystroke for keys-
199. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 810. The circuit court opinion makes much of the fact that
the Lotus menu command hierarchy is unique in that it is actually incorporated into
the structure of the 1-2-3 program code. See id. at 815-16. This incorporation occurs
in such a way that it is not possible to access the functionality of the 1-2-3 code with-
out employing the menu command hierarchy in some form. le This discussion is
irrelevant, however, because Borland is not charged with copying any Lotus code or
with incorporating this particular programming technique in the Quattro Pro pro-
gram. A peculiarity of program structure should not affect the method of copyright
analysis or the result.
200. Samuelson, Counterpoint, supra note 84, at 13.
201. See Manifesto, supra note 7, at 2374-75; see also Clapes, supra note 2, at 91-92
("[A] program's user interfaces determine the degree of the program's user friendli-
ness, a highly qualitative characteristic that has a substantial impact on marketplace
success.").
202. Clapes, supra note 2, at 92.
203. Cf. Samuelson, Counterpoint, supra note 84, at 13 (discussing the economic
policy problems associated with "free riders," those that unfairly benefit when copy-
right provides inadequate protection of valuable components of computer software).
204. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
205. Id. at 69.
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troke. ' 2 °6 Unsurprisingly, the court found Paperback liable to Lotus
for infringement. °7 It is hard to believe that the First Circuit intended
to legitimize such conduct.
If computer program menus are truly unprotectable "methods of
operation," the motivation of the software industry to continue to
dedicate significant resources to the creation of "user friendly" menus
will be seriously reduced, if not eliminated. 0 s Such an interpretation
of the copyright law "would stifle the very creativity that the law is
designed to foster. '20 9
B. The 1-2-3 Menu: Protected Expression Under Altai
If the 1-2-3 menu is actually about labels, and not just a set of but-
tons as the circuit court suggested, then it is not merely a "method of
operation." At least five other federal circuits are at odds with the
"method of operation" holding of the First Circuit in Lotus.2 10 The
Ninth Circuit has stated that "screens, menus, and keystrokes" are
proper areas for copyright protection. 1' The Fifth Circuit held in En-
gineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc.212 that the 230
"input formats"21 3 of a structural engineering program "taken as a
whole, readily qualify as [protectable] 'expression.' "1214 The court
drew a parallel between the expressive characteristics of the 1-2-3
menu and the disputed input formats that it held to be protected ex-
pression. 15 The First Circuit in Lotus was apparently more concerned
206. Id. at 69.
207. Id. at 84.
208. See Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1344
(5th Cir. 1994) ("[If a best-selling program's interface were not copyrightable, com-
petitors would be free to emulate the popular interface exactly .... This cannot be the
law."); Manifesto, supra note 7, at 2365-66, 2379 (noting that by copying program
behavior, a "second comer can produce a market substitute with relatively trivial ef-
fort," thus resulting in market destructive effects).
209. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (citing Iowa State Univ. Research
Fund., Inc v. American Broadcasting Cos., 1621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980)).
210. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 116 S.
Ct. 39 (No. 94-2003), reprinted in Reback, supra note 167, at 213. "The First Circuit's
relatively brief opinion comes as a jarring departure from the prevailing consensus
.... The First Circuit quarrels with everybody: with the district court, with the Nim-
mer treatise, with Learned Hand, and with the Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits."
Reback, supra note 167, at 212.
211. Brown Bag Software, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1477 (9th Cir.
1992) (citing Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added)).
212. 26 F.3d 1335 (5th Cir. 1994).
213. The "input formats" were essentially methods of entering complex arrange-
ments of data into a computer program that was designed to solve structural engineer-
ing problems. Id. at 1338-39.
214. Id. at 1344.
215. Id. at 1345-46 (stating that the 1-2-3 menu "should be copyrightable because
as a whole, the interface's structure and hierarchy constitute a high degree of original
expression").
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with achieving a result that permitted Borland's conduct than it was
with following this significant body of caselaw.216
If the 1-2-3 menu is not a "method of operation," the question still
remains whether it is copyrightable. As in most cases involving nonlit-
eral copying21 7 of computer programs, the initial inquiry attempts to
separate the protectable elements from the unprotectable ones.218
Under Altai, this analysis takes place through the first two steps of
"abstraction" and "filtration." 219 Whatever expression is left pro-
tected is then "compared" to the challenged work to see if a "substan-
tial similarity" exists between the two. °20
1. Abstraction
In the abstraction step, a court retraces the steps followed by the
original creator of the program, beginning with the highest level of
abstraction, and proceeding to the lowest.221 Generally, the highest
level of abstraction would describe the general purpose that the pro-
gram seeks to serve 222 The lowest level of abstraction would be the
actual program code that causes the program to functionm23
In the case of the 1-2-3 program, the highest level of abstraction
could be described as "an electronic spreadsheet." This level consti-
tutes an unprotectable idea, not a protectable expression. A court
would not seriously entertain a claim that the first copyrighted spread-
sheet precluded the creation of subsequent spreadsheet programs.224
In contrast, the actual 1-2-3 program code clearly falls within the
realm of protectable expression, and not unprotectable idea. This
principle has been confirmed by a number of cases that hold that the
literal copying of program code constitutes copyright infringement.225
216. See Band, supra note 149, at 6.
217. Notably, the First Circuit in Lotus did not consider the case to involve nonlit-
eral copying of program elements (the domain of Altai) despite the fact that none of
the 1-2-3 code was copied. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 49 F.3d 807, 814-15 (1st
Cir. 1995), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 116 S. CL 804 (1996). The Court con-
tended that the case was about the "literal copying of... a menu command hierar-
chy." Id. It is possible that this distinction was made to sidestep the Altai-Whelan
debate and avoid Supreme Court review. See Band, supra note 149, at 7.
218. See Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992).
219. 1d. at 706-10; see supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
220. Id. at 710.
221. Id. at 697-98, 706-07.
222. See id. at 707.
223. Id.
224. Lotus was not the first company to employ the idea of a computerized elec-
tronic spreadsheet. VisiCalc, a program that dominated the PC market in its early
stages, was the first program to capitalize on the utility of this concept. See Lotus
Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp 37, 65 (D. Mass. 1990).
225. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240,
1253-54 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that computer program in object code format should
be protected by copyright), cerL dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); Villiams Elecs., Inc.
v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 872-73 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that computer program
instruction codes are protected by copyright).
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The 1-2-3 menu at issue in the Lotus case belongs in neither the
highest nor the lowest category of abstraction. 26 The question there-
fore becomes, at what point along the abstraction spectrum do the
specific labels and structure of the 1-2-3 menu system fall? Are they
more like the "idea" of a computerized spreadsheet, or more like the
program code that expresses the idea?
If the program concept is the idea, and the program code is an ex-
pression of that idea, then a court can draw a parallel to the "idea" of
using a system of user-selected menu options to operate a computer
program, and the resulting menu as expressed in a particular program.
Just as there are many ways to express the idea of a computer spread-
sheet program, there are many ways to express the idea of a spread-
sheet program menu. The idea of a spreadsheet menu is a concept
that is aimed at creating an intuitive and accessible connection be-
tween the user and the machine. The 1-2-3 menu itself is an original
expression of that idea in a specific instance."
The protectable nature of the 1-2-3 menu becomes more apparent
when the menu is viewed as a whole, and not just the sum of its
parts. 2 8 Specifically, "If particular characteristics not distinctive indi-
vidually have been brought together in a way that makes the 'whole' a
distinctive expression of an idea.., then the 'whole' may be copy-
rightable. '229 Thus, even assuming that none of the individual menu
commands was copyrightable, the "selection and arrangement" of the
469 commands in the 1-2-3 menu is eligible for copyright protection,
because it is both creative and original.230 At least in principle, then,
the 1-2-3 menu system may be protected by copyright because it is
more "expression" than "idea."
2. Filtration
Granting the protectable nature of a particular element of a com-
puter program under the abstraction step, the next task is to filter out
any parts of that element that are outside the scope of copyright pro-
226. Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1344
(5th Cir. 1994) ("In the middle of the abstraction spectrum sit user interfaces such as
that of Lotus 1-2-3 ....").
227. This reasoning is consistent with the case law in a number of circuits. See, e.g.,
id. at 1343-44 (comparing the 1-2-3 menu system with a system of 230 input-output
formats to hold the latter system to be protectable expression and not unprotectable
idea); Autoskill Inc. v. National Educ. Support Sys., Inc., 994 F.2d 1476, 1492 (10th
Cir. 1993) (upholding the district court's determination that originality of organiza-
tion, structure, and sequence results in protectable expression under the abstraction
analysis); Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1175-76
(9th Cir. 1989) (same).
228. Paperback, 740 F. Supp. at 67.
229. iU.
230. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348-49 (1991).
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tection231 The court must go beyond the idea-expression dichotomy
to determine whether the 1-2-3 menu system warrants protection.
The Altai court focused on three categories of elements that must
be denied protection in the filtration process: (1) elements dictated by
efficiency; (2) elements dictated by external factors; and (3) elements
taken from the public domainm 2 These three categories within the
filtration process fall under the doctrines of merger and scines-d-
faire.233
As observed above, the merger doctrine would deny protection to a
menu that consisted only of the items "Print" and "Exit."' ' - After all,
there are only so many ways of expressing those concepts. Although
"Print" and "Exit" are both included in the 1-2-3 menu and are
fitered out, these items are only two of 469 selections that the user
may makeP-5 The district court correctly noted that the stunning vari-
ety of representations of 469 menu selections arranged in fifty differ-
ent menus precludes a finding that the 1-2-3 menu system was entirely
the product of functional constraints.
Similarly, the scenes-d-faire doctrine will prohibit protection for "in-
cidents, characters or settings which are as a practical matter indispen-
sable, or at least standard, in the treatment of a given topic."' -1 The
scenes-d-faire doctrine applied to the 1-2-3 menu would certainly deny
protection to menu items and characteristics that are common to most
computer program menus. For example, like most modem menu-
driven programs, the 1-2-3 for Windows menu includes as the first
three menu headings the words File, Edit, and View?3 7 This arrange-
ment is probably unprotected under scdnes-d-faire doctrine even
though not dictated by functional constraints.
The filtration stage, therefore, removes from protection the compo-
nents of the 1-2-3 menu that are dictated by function, and the compo-
nents that are dictated by convention. Only a small fraction of the
overall 1-2-3 menu system is filtered out in this stage. The majority of
the menu remains as protected expression. Indeed, the remaining
portion is probably what motivated Lotus to file the lawsuit.
231. See Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 707-10 (2d Cir. 1992).
232. Id
233. See Engineering Dynamics, 26 F.3d at 1344-45; see also supra notes 42-47, and
accompanying text (discussing merger and scdnes-d-faire doctrines).
234. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
235. The Circuit Court cited the commands "print" and "copy" as proof of the un-
protected nature of the 1-2-3 menu, but never addressed the protectability of the 1-2-3
menu as a whole. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 49 F.3d 807, 815 (lst Cir. 1995),
aff'd by an equally divided Court, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996).
236. Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th
Cir. 1982) (citing Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)).
237. Lotus Development Corporation, User's Guide: Lotus 1-2-3 Release 4
Spreadsheet for Windows 10 (1993).
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3. Comparison
The court determining the infringement issue must now compare
the remaining elements of the 1-2-3 menu with the corresponding ele-
ments in the Quattro Pro program. According to Altai, two determi-
nations take place at this stage. First, the court must determine if
"substantial similarity" exists between the remaining protected ex-
pression and the allegedly infringing program.238 Second, the court
must make "an assessment of the copied portion's relative importance
with respect to the plaintiff's overall program. '239
A strong argument can be made that the level of similarity required
for infringement should depend in part on the range of expression
available to the copyrighted and allegedly infringing works.2 40 A
work of fiction, for example, should not require as much similarity for
a finding of infringement as would a purely factual work.24' Because
all spreadsheet menus are similar to the extent that they are expres-
sing a similar idea, a high standard of similarity should be required for
a finding of infringement.242 Because Borland concedes that its use of
the 1-2-3 menu is a verbatim use, the conclusion is inescapable that
the menus are substantially similar.243
As for the second determination, a finding of substantial similarity
will be dispositive unless the amount copied is so small as to be insig-
nificant.2 " In this case, not only was the 1-2-3 menu copied in its en-
tirety, but the menu is qualitatively important to the 1-2-3 program. 245
Thus, under the Altai test, Borland's use of the 1-2-3 menu infringes
the Lotus copyright. Borland should therefore be liable unless it can
invoke the affirmative defense of fair use.
238. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 710 (2d Cir. 1992).
239. Id.
240. See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349
(1991) (confirming the protectability of factual compilations, but stating that such
protection is "thin").
241. See id. at 348-350.
242. In contrast, a menu system designed to control a fictional video game would
probably not require as much similarity to justify a finding of infringement, because
the range of possible expression is greater. See, e.g., Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips
Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 619 (7th Cir. 1982) (considering the nature and
setting of the works and finding substantial similarity between'two fictional video
games notwithstanding the fact that significant differences existed between the two).
243. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 831 F. Supp 223, 234 (D. Mass.
1993) ("[W]hat was copied by Borland... is virtually identical to [the] expression of
the Lotus 1-2-3 program's menu structure."), rev'd, 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff'd
by an equally divided Court, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996). Even under the "virtual identity"
standard followed in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 821 F. Supp 616, 625(N.D. Cal. 1993), Borland's use would constitute infringement.
244. 3 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 24, § 13.03[F], at 13-148.
245. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp 37, 68 (D. Mass.
1990).
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C. The Fair Use Doctrine Can Properly Evaluate Interoperability
Issues
If the 1-2-3 menu enjoys copyright protection and Borland has in-
fringed that copyright, then the best available means of evaluating
Borland's interoperability arguments is through the fair use doc-
trine.4 6 The doctrine is most naturally applicable where the defend-
ant concedes the use of plaintiff's material, but argues that the court
should not construe the law to prohibit such a use. 7 As noted above,
the fair use doctrine is codified by statute and provides for the balanc-
ing of four factors to determine if a particular use of protected mate-
rial is fair.2 8 This part will now evaluate the four factors with regard
to the facts of Borland's use of the 1-2-3 menu, focusing particularly
on interoperability issues.
1. The Purpose and Character of the Use
Until recently, much of the caselaw that has interpreted this factor
has focused on whether the disputed use of the copyrighted material is
for commercial purposes.24 9 In this case, Borland's use of the 1-2-3
menu is unquestionably commercial, a fact that weighs against a find-
ing of fair use. 50 The district court rejected Borland's fair use de-
fense, stating that "when a defendant's use of copied materials is
determined to be commercial, that use is 'presumptively an unfair ex-
ploitation of... the copyright.' ,,21
This reasoning does not reflect a proper interpretation of the stat-
ute. 52 The Supreme Court has recently stated that "[t]he language of
the statute makes cleasr that the commercial... purpose of a work is
only one element of the first factor enquiry into [the use's] purpose
and character. 'a 53 Thus, to evaluate this factor properly, a court must
consider the use from the perspective of the interoperability require-
ments of computer programs. To this effect, in a concurrence to the
First Circuit opinion in Lotus, Judge Boudin criticized the district
court's rejection of the fair use defense, stating: "'[P]resumptively'
does not mean 'always' and, in any event, the doctrine of fair use was
246. See, e.g., Raskind, supra note 51, at 1182 (recommending the application of the
fair use doctrine to "serve as an arbiter between permissible use[s] of protected
software... and impermissible piracy").
247. In the Lotus case, Borland argued both that the 1-2-3 menu was unprotected,
and alternatively that their use of it was fair. Lotus, 831 F. Supp. at 229, 240-45.
248. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994); see supra notes 48-60 and accompanying text.
249. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562(1985) (distinguishing commercial uses from nonprofit educational uses); Sony Corp.
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,451 (1984) (stating that commer-
cial uses of copyrighted material are presumptively unfair).
250. See Patry, supra note 52, at 426.
251. Lotus, 831 F. Supp. at 242 (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207,237 (1990)
(citation omitted)).
252. See Patty, supra note 52, at 420-21.
253. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1174 (1994).
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created by the courts and can be adapted to new purposes. 2 54 Judge
Boudin suggested that the utilitarian nature of computer programs re-
quires the modification of traditional copyright analysis to address
new issues.255
a. Interoperability As a Fair Use
In addition to being utilitarian in nature, computer programs are
also unique in copyright law in that they must be able to coexist in an
organized, interoperable framework that allows communication be-
tween the user and the program, as well as between one program and
another.256 Interoperability requirements demand that the scope of
the "temporary monopoly" granted by copyright protection be tai-
lored to both protect the expression of the author and to not unrea-
sonably restrict the investment, creativity, or expressions of others. In
other words, a copyright monopoly granted in one "market ' '1 57 should
not exercise its power over other "markets." 8
An example will illustrate how these software "markets" interact.
Microsoft Windows is a popular operating system25 9 that serves the
personal computer operating systems market.260 If the copyright pro-
tection for Microsoft Windows could prevent application programs,26'
like 1-2-3 or WordPerfect, from being viable products, then the Win-
dows copyright has acted outside of the legitimate scope of protection
that copyright should afford it.262 This overprotection would occur if
the specific data structures that allow the necessary communication
between the Windows operating system and the application programs
that run under Windows were held to be copyr~ghtable.263 The idea-
254. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 49 F.3d 807, 821 (1st Cir. 1995) (Boudin, J.,
concurring), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996).
255. See id. at 819-20 (Boudin, J., concurring).
256. See Manifesto, supra note 7, at 2375-76.
257. The term "market" is used here as an abstraction to describe the extent to
which a particular copyrighted work meets a particular need.
258. See, e.g., Band, supra note 149, at 6 (observing that a "monopolist has little
incentive to innovate-the ultimate goal of the intellectual property system");
Gordon, supra note 143, at 868-69 (arguing for the desirability of competitive intellec-
tual property markets and protection thereof); Warren-Boulton, supra note 150, at 18
(arguing that the leveraging of a copyright monopoly into other markets makes the
rest of society worse off).
259. An "operating system" like Windows provides a software environment that
allows the application programs to run. See Clapes, supra note 2, at 28.
260. See Manifesto, supra note 7, at 2377.
261. "Application programs" include word processors, spreadsheets, and database
programs that interact directly with the user. They are to be contrasted with operat-
ing systems that allow the application programs to run. See Bernard A. Galler,
Software and Intellectual Property Protection 50-51 (1995).
262. See, e.g., Warren-Boulton, supra note 150, at 18 (arguing that allowing a copy-
right monopoly should not be used for anticompetitive purposes).
263. See, e.g., Clapes, supra note 2, at 179-82 (noting that conformity of "internal
formats and protocols" is necessary for compatibility).
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expression distinction is one method of preventing such copyright
abuses.264
The facts of Lotus are analogous. If Lotus can block macro compat-
ibility by claiming copyright infringement, then the user-created
macros are subject to the copyright monopoly held by Lotus, despite
the fact that Lotus has contributed nothing to the expression incorpo-
rated into the user's macro." 5 Similarly, Lotus would hold a monop-
oly over the user's investment in learning the menus of 1-2-3, an
investment which is not a result of any contribution by the Lotus
programmers.
Judge Boudin's concurring opinion noted this fact: "If Lotus is
granted a monopoly on this [menu] pattern, users who have learned
the command structure of Lotus 1-2-3 or devised their own macros are
locked into Lotus .... ,,' Under this reasoning, uses of copyrighted
material that facilitate interoperability should be more likely to be fair
uses because they prevent the unwarranted extension of the copyright
monopoly into separate markets.
b. Transformative Works
Borland's use of the menu is also supported by the fact that the
Quattro Pro program is transformative. 7 To determine whether a
work is transformative, the court asks if the work merely "supplant[s]
the original... or instead adds something new, with a further purpose
or different character."'  The circuit court noted that "Borland's ob-
jective was to develop a spreadsheet program far superior to existing
programs, including Lotus 1-2-3."'
Quattro Pro does not merely duplicate the functionality of 1-2-3-it
supersedes it: "[T]he goal of copyright, to promote science and the
arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative
works."2 70 If Borland had marketed Quattro Pro solely as a cheap
version of 1-2-3, its use of the 1-2-3 menu would not be transforma-
five; it would be more like theft.
Thus, the first fair use factor should weigh in favor of Borland. De-
spite Quattro Pro's commercial nature, the character and purpose of
its use of the 1-2-3 menu legitimately serves to facilitate the interoper-
ability of user-created macros and investment in learning the menu.
264. Warren-Boulton, supra note 150, at 18.
265. See, e.g., Lewis Galoob Toys v. Nimtendo of Am., 780 F. Supp. 1283, 1297(N.D. Cal. 1991) (arguing that the commercial success of a copyrighted product does
not warrant the extension of protection beyond that granted by the law).
266. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 49 F.3d 807,821 (1st Cir. 1995) (Boudin, J.,
concurring), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 116 S. CL 804 (1996).
267. See Band, supra note 149, at 5-6.
268. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. CL 1164, 1171 (1994).
269. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 810.
270. See Acuff-Rose Music, 114 S. CL at 1171.
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Moreover, its functionality goes beyond that of 1-2-3, making it a
"transformative work."
2. The Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The second fair use factor recognizes that copyrighted works re-
ceive differing levels of protection depending on their type.2 71 This
differentiation occurs because "the law generally recognizes a greater
need to disseminate factual works than works of fiction or fantasy. '272
Thus, works with strong factual characteristics, such as the 1-2-3 menu,
are copyrightable, but the copyright in such a work is "thin. '273
The district court argued that even for functional works, where the
author enjoys a great deal of freedom in creating his expression, the
scope of the protection afforded should be greater.2 74 In the case of
the 1-2-3 menu, however, this argument is unpersuasive because de-
spite the creative features of the 1-2-3 menu, the degree of creativity is
constrained by the function that the menu is designed to serve. Simi-
lar restrictions are faced by all authors of spreadsheet menus, and the
commands the menus access are frequently identical. Thus, in the
spectrum of fictional works to factual works, the 1-2-3 menu is more
fact than fiction.275 As a result, this factor also weighs in Borland's
favor.276
3. The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used
The third fair use factor evaluates the significance of the copied ma-
terial to the copyrighted work. The evaluation not only looks at what
percentage of the copyrighted work is used, but also looks to the rela-
tive importance of the copied portions.277 Even where only small por-
tions of the copyrighted work are used, if they constitute the "heart"
of the work, the factor must weigh against finding a fair use.278
271. Patry, supra note 52, at 504-07.
272. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985).
273. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1524 (9th Cir. 1992)
(citing Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991)).
274. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 831 F. Supp. 223, 242-43 (D. Mass. 1993),
rev'd, 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 116 S. Ct. 804
(1996).
275. Computer programs are usually classified as "factual works." Patry, supra note
52, at 505-06 & n.483.
276. Some commentators caution against a "mechanical weighing of the second fac-
tor against the [computer software] copyright owner." Il at 519-20. Considering the
similar nature of all spreadsheet programs and their menu systems, however, it is
appropriate to conclude that the second factor was established to draw a distinction
between restricted expression such as the 1-2-3 menu and the unrestricted expression
typical of works of fiction.
277. See id. at 549-51.
278. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp 1067, 1072
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (Owen, J.) (citation omitted).
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As observed above, the design of the menu system is a significant
feature of a complicated computer spreadsheet program. 79 It is one
of the key elements in determining how easy a program is to use, and
how attractive the program will be to the consumern8m Considering
the importance of the menu to the 1-2-3 program and the fact that
Borland copied the menu entirely, this factor must weigh in favor of
Lotus.
4. The Effect of the Use Upon the Potential Market for the
Copyrighted Work
The fourth factor evaluates the economic impact of the challenged
use on the copyrighted work. 8 ' In many respects, this factor is the
most significant aspect of the fair use evaluation?82 It is not, however,
merely a superficial analysis that determines the loss in value of the
copyright resulting from the use. In at least some sense, every legally
permissible use of copyrighted material decreases the value of the
copyright.283
In analyzing the fourth fair use factor, the court must draw distinc-
tions between "remediable" and "unremediable" harm?8 By making
it easier for 1-2-3 users to switch to Quattro Pro, Borland's use would
decrease the value of the 1-2-3 copyright. If the protection Lotus
seeks goes beyond the proper scope of its copyright, however, the re-
sulting decrease is not of a type that should weigh against a finding of
fair use.2 5 Thus, in order to evaluate the market effects properly, a
court should consider the impact of Borland's use on the purchasing
decisions made by consumers.
Although the retail cost of today's packaged software has fallen
considerably when compared with the software of the past, "measur-
ing the true cost of acquiring software requires taking into account the
cost of using a new product." 2 6 For example, a typical employee
earning $40,000 a year costs a company fifty dollars per hour at
279. See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
280. See Clapes, supra note 2, at 91-92.
281. See Patty, supra note 52, at 561-63.
282. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566; see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
114 S. Ct. 1164, 1177 (1994) (holding that a fair use proponent "would have difficulty
carrying the burden of demonstrating fair use without favorable evidence about rele-
vant markets").
283. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 49 F.3d 807, 820 (1st Cir. 1995) (Boudin,
J., concurring) (noting that "any use of the Lotus menu by Borland is a commercial
use and deprives Lotus a portion of it's 'reward," but stating that "this is circular
reasoning"), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996).
284. See Acuff-Rose Music, 114 S. CL at 1178 (stating that copyright law distin-
guishes between "remediable" and "unremediable" harm to the market for the origi-
nal work).
285. See, eg., id. at 1178-79 (holding that damage to an unprotectable market does
not weigh against a finding of fair use).
286. Manifesto, supra note 7, at 2374 (emphasis added).
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work." 7 Thus, the time spent by the employee learning to use a new
software package can easily cost more to the company than the
purchase of the software does.288 Given these realities, the significant
economic barriers inherent in switching from one type of spreadsheet
to another (once the investment in learning and developing macros
has been made) are clear.
But what about the company that is looking to make its first invest-
ment in an electronic spreadsheet? For them, no prior investment in
learning requires protection. The primary considerations of the initial
purchasing decision will be (1) the retail cost of the software and its
functionality, and (2) the cost and ease of learning to use the software
and integrating it into the company's business.
This difference in purchasing considerations highlights a key fact of
Borland's defense of interoperability. The decision about whether to
switch from 1-2-3 to Quattro Pro is different from the decision to
make an initial purchase of Quattro Pro as opposed to 1-2-3. Bor-
land's interoperability defense only applies to the former decision and
not to the latter. This is because no existing user investments prevent
the first-time buyer from choosing the electronic spreadsheet that is
most suitable.289
The perspective of the first-time buyer also points out a key differ-
ence between Borland's use of the 1-2-3 menu for (1) the purpose of
macro compatibility, and (2) as part of the Quattro Pro user interface.
The macro compatibility feature is of no consequence to the first-time
buyers of an electronic spreadsheet, because they have no macros yet.
By contrast, a company that is going to invest in an electronic
spreadsheet for the first time may in fact give significant weight to the
fact that the 1-2-3 menu system is included with Quattro Pro in addi-
tion to the Quattro Pro menu. 90 This feature will be important for at
least two reasons. First, the buyers of Quattro Pro in essence get two
programs for the price of one because the users can then choose be-
tween the two menu systems to find the one that works best for them.
Second, any new employees who join the company at a later time who
are familiar with either Quattro Pro or 1-2-3 will be accommodated by
the purchase of Quattro Pro, but not by the purchase of only 1-2-3.
This analysis leads to three conclusions with regard to interpreting the
fourth fair use factor.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 2374-75; see also Farrell, supra note 148, at 37 n.3 ("[O]ne consultant
estimates that training costs for a popular spreadsheet program are approximately
one thousand dollars per user.").
289. These "market segment" differences will arise in any circumstance where a
competitor seeks to incorporate components of a "de facto" industry standard to fa-
cilitate interoperability.
290. See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
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F'rst, losses to Lotus that arise out of facilitating a switch to Quattro
Pro by existing 1-2-3 users do not weigh against a finding of fair use.
Those considering a switch from 1-2-3 to Quattro Pro face the "mar-
ket barriers" '291 associated with having invested time and effort to use
1-2-3 and write macros for it. The users of 1-2-3 are reluctant to
switch to Quattro Pro because they will have to throw away their in-
vestment in learning the 1-2-3 menu system. Granting such protection
to Lotus would coopt the investment by the public in its program.
Copyright protection should not exercise its monopoly power over
this investment by the user. Therefore, removing these market barri-
ers does not result in any remediable harm to Lotus.
Second, the use of the 1-2-3 menu to achieve macro compatibility in
Quattro Pro does not result in any additional decrease to the value of
1-2-3 copyright. Because a first-time buyer of an electronic spread-
sheet program has not written any macros for 1-2-3, no additional in-
jury to Lotus takes place when first-time buyers are added into the
market analysis. Therefore, the only effect of this particular use is the
removal of the market barriers faced by owners of 1-2-3 who have
invested time and effort writing macros for 1-2-3.
Third, the use of the 1-2-3 menu as part of the Quattro Pro user
interface allows an unwarranted free ride on the copyrighted expres-
sion of 1-2-3 for first-time buyers of electronic spreadsheets. Consum-
ers who have not invested time and effort learning to use 1-2-3 may
find Quattro Pro to be a more attractive program because of the inclu-
sion of the 1-2-3 menu as an option in Quattro Pro. To this extent, the
increase in the attractiveness of Quattro Pro comes entirely at the ex-
pense of the 1-2-3 copyright.
Given these conclusions, the fourth fair use factor must weigh in
Borland's favor with regard to the macro compatibility use, and in
favor of Lotus with regard to the use of the 1-2-3 menu in the Quattro
Pro user interface.
D. Evaluation of the Fair Use Factors
To protect computer software from cheap "knockoffs," a compli-
cated system of menus must have some copyright protection. To call
the 1-2-3 menu a "method of operation" is an oversimplification.
Great creative effort is expended to design program menus in an ac-
cessible way.2g The result of this creativity is precisely the kind of
expression that copyright law is supposed to protect.293
291. The term "market barrier" is used here to describe the artificial reluctance of
existing 1-2-3 users to switch to Quattro Pro, when they would otherwise seek to em-
ploy some additional functionality provided by Quattro Pro. Cf Manifesto, supra note
7, at 2412 (discussing artificial barriers to market entry by manufacturers).
292. Samuelson, Counterpoint, supra note 84, at 13.
293. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 67 (D. Mass.
1990).
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The balance of the four fair use factors strongly supports a finding
that the use of the 1-2-3 menu to facilitate macro compatibility is a fair
use under § 107. The first, second, and fourth factors all support this
use. It does not have an unfair negative impact on the market for 1-2-
3 because only those consumers who have written their own macros
will be affected by the use. Borland should therefore be permitted to
incorporate the 1-2-3 menu in the Quattro Pro program for the pur-
pose of providing macro compatibility.
The use of the 1-2-3 menu in the Quattro Pro user interface
presents a more difficult problem. Only the first and second factors
support the use, with the third and fourth weighing against it. This
result requires a balancing of the positive effects resulting from inter-
operability with the negative effects arising from the loss of legitimate
copyright protection to determine whether the use is fair.294 Argu-
ments exist on both sides. Nonetheless, it seems that where the un-
warranted harm to the copyrighted work arising from the use is
substantial, as it could be here, even a strong argument for fair use
must fail if copyright protection is to be meaningful.295
VI. APPLICATION OF MARKET ANALYSIS TO LOTUS. A LIMITED
FAIR USE
The basic problem with Borland's use of the 1-2-3 menu in the
Quattro Pro user interface is that it gives Borland access to a free ride
from first-time spreadsheet purchasers who choose Quattro Pro. Bor-
land benefits unfairly at the expense of Lotus when consumers who do
not already own 1-2-3 purchase Quattro Pro because of the inclusion
of the 1-2-3 menu. If a court can calibrate protection to minimize the
unwarranted harm to Lotus, perhaps Borland's use of the 1-2-3 menu
as part of the Quattro Pro user interface could qualify as a fair use.296
Because the harm to the market for 1-2-3 only manifests itself in the
purchasing decision of consumers who do not already own a copy of 1-
2-3, any resolution should focus on denying Borland access to that
market.297 One means of accomplishing this would be to require Bor-
land to establish proof of ownership of a copy of 1-2-3 by the con-
sumer before the 1-2-3 menu emulation could be enabled in Quattro
Pro. Such proof could consist of a copy of the 1-2-3 license included
with the program. Once a Quattro Pro consumer established owner-
294. See Raskind, supra note 51, at 1182.
295. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 312 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that "unfair
copying undercuts demand for the original work and, as an inevitable consequence,
chills creation of such works").
296. See, e.g., Raskind, supra note 51, at 1181-82 (arguing for the extension of fair
use to reflect industry practices, maintain the incentive to create, and avoid diminish-
ing the competitive value of copyrighted works).
297. The relevant market would be the first time buyers of electronic spreadsheets
that desired access to the 1-2-3 menu.
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ship of the 1-2-3 program, Borland could enable the 1-2-3 menu emu-
lation either by providing the user with a password, or by shipping a
computer disk that added the feature onto an installed copy of Quat-
tro Pro.
Existing caselaw provides some support for this reasoning. In Lewis
Galoob Toys v. Nintendo of America,2 98 the Ninth Circuit addressed
the question of whether a computer game cartridge that altered the
performance of another copyrighted computer game resulted in an
unauthorized "derivative work." 2 The court found that although the
copyrighted program was being used in a manner unanticipated by its
creators, the challenged use was fair under § 107.300 Central to this
holding was the conclusion that the primary market for the copy-
righted work was not undermined by the creation of the derivative
work.30 1 Nintendo's market remained unaffected because Galoob's
product was useless without the purchase of Nintendo's games.3o2
This Note suggests that the availability of the fair use defense to
sanction the copying of user interface elements necessary for inter-
operability should be predicated on proof that the use was strictly lim-
ited to facilitating interoperability. Where the use has effects that go
beyond facilitating interoperability to undermine the demand for the
original unfairly, the defense should not be available. This approach
will be called "limited fair use." The effects of such an approach will
now be analyzed from the perspective of Lotus, Borland, and the pub-
lic in general.
A. Effect on Lotus
Clearly Lotus would be better off under the limited fair use ap-
proach than it is under the "method of operation" rule of the First
Circuit.30 3 Under the "method of operation" rule, Lotus is not only
vulnerable to uses of its menus by major competitors like Borland, but
it is also vulnerable to "low-rent" competitors who manufacture
"clones," whose only attraction is offering a cheaper version of 1-2-
3.304 The circuit opinion apparently endorses "keystroke for keys-
298. 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992), cert denied, 113 S. C. 1582 (1993).
299. Id. at 967.
300. Id. at 972. The plaintiff, Nintendo, had asserted that the use of defendant's
product resulted in the creation of an unauthorized derivative work. Id. at 967.
Although the Ninth Circuit dismissed the derivative work theory, it held that even if
Galoob's product did create derivative works, Galoob would not be liable under the
fair use doctrine. Id. at 972.
301. Id. at 971.
302. Lewis Galoob Toys v. Nimtendo of Am., 780 F. Supp. 1283, 1294 (N.D. Cal.
1991).
303. See supra notes 189-95 and accompanying text.
304. Manifesto, supra note 7, at 2366 ("Firms that can rapidly replicate the innova-
tive behavior of another firm's product at much lower development costs can supply a
market substitute that will deny the innovator an adequate opportunity to recoup its
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troke" compatibility claims of products like Paperback's VP-
Planner.305
The limited fair use approach would effectively prohibit uses of the
1-2-3 menu system in programs like VP-Planner that are not trans-
formative. This result arises because limited fair use is predicated on
preexisting ownership; therefore, the clone market is restricted to
those who already own the original, a very small market indeed.3 0 6
Thus, under limited fair use, only transformative works will be viable
candidates for incorporating the copyrighted menus.
In some sense, Lotus is in fact better off under limited fair use than
it would have been had the district court opinion prevailed, granting
full protection to the 1-2-3 menu and denying Borland's fair use de-
fense.30 7 Allowing transformative works to borrow elements neces-
sary for interoperability creates another market for the original
expression.30 8 If access to that market is restricted to the original
copyright holder, some increased demand for the original expression
should result. The proceeds of the increased demand would flow di-
rectly to Lotus.
Imagine a hypothetical company employing 100 people who all use
1-2-3. Imagine further that the company wants to switch to Quattro
Pro to obtain additional functionality. Under the limited fair use ap-
proach, if the company switched, it could obtain access to the 1-2-3
menu by virtue of the 100 1-2-3 licenses that it already owned. Now
suppose that the company expanded its operation and added an addi-
tional twenty people. In order to continue to enjoy both the 1-2-3
menu and the Quattro Pro functionality, it must purchase both prod-
ucts. In this way, allowing consumer access to the 1-2-3 menu in Quat-
tro Pro both expands the market for 1-2-3 and achieves
interoperability at the same time.
B. Effect on Borland
Borland contended from the beginning that it included the 1-2-3
menu in Quattro Pro so that "spreadsheet users who were already
familiar with Lotus 1-2-3 would be able to switch to the Borland pro-
grams without having to learn new commands. '30 9 To contend other-
wise would have resulted in an indefensible position. As noted in the
research and development expenses and make sufficient profits to justify its initial
investment in innovation.").
305. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 69-70 (D. Mass
1990).
306. See Clapes, supra note 2, at 204-05.
307. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 831 F. Supp. 223,245 (D. Mass. 1993), rev'd,
49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996); see
also supra notes 177-88 and accompanying text (discussing the district court opinion).
308. See Manifesto, supra note 7, at 2371-72.
309. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 49 F.3d 807, 810 (1st Cir. 1995), aff'd by an
equally divided Court, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996).
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preceding section, Borland's stated purpose only applies to those who
already own a copy of 1-2-3.310 Thus, the limited fair use approach is
consistent with the stated objective sought by Borland because it al-
lows owners of 1-2-3 to switch without losing any personal investment
in learning.311
In a strict sense, Borland achieves its goal under the limited fair use
approach, with the exception that it faces some additional transaction
costs associated with establishing customer ownership of a 1-2-3 li-
cense. Additional transaction costs would probably not be minimal
considering the efforts of software companies to "register" 312 the own-
ers of their software.313 Moreover, many software companies already
offer special "upgrade" discounts called "trade up editions" that are
available to existing owners of competing products. 3.1 Because the
availability of the fair use defense would depend on proper registra-
tion, the motivation to administer the system effectively would be
high. In any event, any inconvenience is a small price to pay for the
use of copyrighted material that allows the company to compete more
effectively.
C. Effect on the Public
The primary concern expressed by the First Circuit in Lots was
that "if a user uses several different programs, he or she must learn
how to perform the same operation in a different way for each pro-
gram used.... We find this absurd. 315 The court concluded that once
the users of 1-2-3 had become familiar with the 1-2-3 menu, to allow
copyright law to prevent them from employing that knowledge to use
other programs would be bad policy.316
310. See supra notes 286-89 and accompanying text.
311. Arguably, the owners of software licenses use the software, a fact which the
limited fair use approach does not account for. In the end, however, only the owner
of the software license determines the specifics of who can use the copy, as well as
where and when it can be used.
312. Software registration is typically accomplished by the completion and return
of a registration card included with the software. Users benefit from the registration
of software because it typically entitles the user to new product information and may
provide for software upgrades. See Thomas J. Smedinghoff, Avoiding Liability for
Copyright Infringement Preventive Measures for Software Users, 5 No. 11 J. Proprie-
tary Rts. 2, 9 (1993).
313. Whether or not the transaction costs associated with the limited fair use ap-
proach would result in the underutilization of interoperability potential is debatable.
When compared to the all or nothing approach taken by the district and circuit courts
in Lotus, however, it seems that limited fair use is superior to both approaches in that
it achieves interoperability and encourages creative development.
314. These upgrade discounts include with the software a program that electroni-
cally inspects the host computer to see if the competing software is actually resident in
the computer before the new software is installed.
315. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 49 F.3d 807, 817-18 (lst Cir. 1995), aff'd by
an equally divided Court, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996).
316. See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 818.
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The limited fair use approach, which requires Borland to establish
the legitimacy of these consumer desires, does not undermine the First
Circuit's concern for allowing interoperability. The only consumers
denied access to the 1-2-3 menu are those who receive no interoper-
ability benefits. Such consumers are therefore beyond the scope of
the circuit court's concern.317
The district court, on the other hand, expressed a different concern,
stating that de facto industry standards such as the 1-2-3 menu should
not suffer the erosion of their copyright protection because of their
success in the marketplace. 318 This policy also is not undercut by the
approach described above. Indeed, the market for the 1-2-3 menu is
entirely maintained because in order for the 1-2-3 menu to be used in
Quattro Pro, the consumer must have already purchased a copy of 1-
2-3.
The only distinction between the limited fair use approach and com-
plete copyright protection would be that once the 1-2-3 menu is
"owned '3 19 by the consumer, the consumer may use it in a way that
was not intended by the manufacturer. The fact that the use was unin-
tended does not necessarily give the copyright holder any grounds for
complaint. 320 Indeed, the fair use doctrine itself expressly sanctions
unintended uses of copyrighted material.32'
The public receives significant benefit from allowing unintended
uses of copyrighted material that facilitate interoperability.3 11 The
benefits of interoperability fade quickly, however, when they are used
to justify an attack on the primary market for copyrighted works. If
interoperability becomes a justification for wholesale copying of im-
portant expressive elements of a successful program's user interface,
then the motivation to innovate in this area will disintegrate.32 3
317. The exclusion of such consumers may actually prove to be beneficial. It has
been suggested that a cost of interoperability lies in the loss in efficiency that arises
where a particular standard becomes outmoded. See Farrell, supra note 148, at 36-37.
If the consumers who do not benefit directly from interoperability are excluded from
this calculus, the perpetuation of outmoded standards is less likely to occur.
318. Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 79 (D.
Mass. 1990).
319. Consumers of computer software do not actually own the software that they
purchase. What they actually purchase is a software license for the copy which they
possess.
320. See Lewis Galoob Toys v. Nintendo of Am., 780 F. Supp. 1283, 1290 (N.D. Cal,
1991) (citing Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)); see also
Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 261 (5th Cir. 1988) (refusing to find
copyright infringement notwithstanding unintended use of copyrighted software).
321. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) ("Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and
106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work.., is not an infringement of copyright.").
322. See Manifesto, supra note 7, at 2368; see also Farrell, supra note 148, at 36
(describing the benefits of interoperability standards in terms of "network
externalities").
323. See Manifesto, supra note 7, at 2379 (arguing that the economic return justifies
the investment in innovation); see also Farrell, supra note 148, at 36-37 (suggesting
that the loss of incentive to innovate can result from excess standardization).
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The district court opinion in Lotus made no accommodation for in-
teroperability concerns. It would overprotect the Lotus menu, deny-
ing the program users the right to retain their personal investment in
learning and developing macros. By contrast, the First Circuit opinion
in Lotus allowed interoperability concerns to completely supersede
established copyright principles. It would underprotect the Lotus
menu, affording no protection to a valuable and expressive compo-
nent of the 1-2-3 program. A balance must be struck between these
two extremes. The value of the limited fair use approach lies in the
recognition of both the benefits of interoperability to the public and
the important role of copyright protection in ensuring the continuing
creation of expressive works.
CONCLUSION
The proper method of evaluating the interoperability issues raised
by copyrighted computer programs should take a market-oriented fair
use approach. Courts must distinguish between uses that facilitate in-
teroperability and uses that directly attack the market for the copy-
righted work. Where a particular use of copyrighted material
facilitates interoperability and does not result in unfair harm to the
copyrighted work, the use should qualify as a fair use. By contrast,
uses that facilitate interoperability but also carry a substantial risk of
unfair harm to the copyrighted work cannot receive the court's ap-
proval if copyright protection is to be meaningful and effective.
The copying of user interface components can be a method of
achieving interoperability as well as allowing innovative programs to
compete on more equal footing with established predecessors. The
permissibility of the use should depend on the critical distinction be-
tween primary and secondary markets. Permission for the use should
therefore be predicated on proof of ownership of the original. If it is
not, the goal of achieving interoperability can act as a rationalization
for undermining the market for the original. Market destructive
forces will arise from allowing interoperability goals to overwhelm all
protection for important, expressive elements of computer programs.
The law must recognize both the benefits and the limitations of inter-
operability to advance the arts and sciences effectively.
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